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This paper examines the likely growth of U.S. GDP in the decade beginning in 2010.  I analyze the
two components of the rise in GDP over this ten year period:  (1) the recovery from the substantially
depressed level of economic activity at the start of the decade; and (2) the rise in potential GDP that
will result from the expansion of the labor force, the growth of the capital stock, and the increase of
multifactor productivity. I calculate a likely growth rate of 2.6 percent a year.
Not all of that extra output will remain in the United States.  If the trade deficit is reduced by three
percent of GDP, the rise in exports and decline in imports will reduce output available for U.S. consumption
and investment by about 0.3 percent a year.
The effect of a decline of the dollar could be equally important.  If the real trade-weighted value of
the dollar declines by 25 percent over the decade and the full effect of that dollar decline is reflected
in the prices of imports, the increased cost of imports would reduce the the growth of our real incomes
by about 0.4 percent a year.
These two international effects would leave the net growth of real goods and services available for
US consumption and investment -- both domestically produced and imported -- at 1.9 percent a  year.









   U.S. Growth in the Decade Ahead 
     




  The beginning of 2010 is a good time to consider the likely pace of 
growth during the decade ahead.   It is of course not clear how the 
economy will behave in the current year, let alone in the coming ten years.  
The rise of GDP that began in the third quarter of 2009 was not an ordinary 
cyclical recovery.  The economy’s growth in the second half of last year 
was driven by a strong fiscal stimulus, including not only increased federal 
spending and transfers but also special subsidies to car buyers and to first 
time home buyers.  Home buying was also stimulated by the sharp drop in 
mortgage rates that increased the number of individuals who could qualify 
for mortgages on properties that they liked.  These forms of stimulus will be 
missing in 2010, creating a serious cloud over the near-term economic 
outlook.  
 
  Looking further ahead, it will be difficult to have a robust recovery as 
long as the residential and commercial real estate markets are depressed 
and the local banks around the country restrict their lending because of 
their concern about possible defaults on real estate loans. Any economic 
expansion could also be suppressed if the enormous fiscal deficits 
projected for the coming decades lead to rising long term real interest 
rates.   
 
  But while mindful of all of these near-term risks, I will make the  
optimistic but plausible assumption that the economy will fully recover over 
the next ten years. With that assumption, we can usefully decompose the 
projected GDP growth over the next decade into the cyclical recovery and 
the evolution of potential GDP.  While potential GDP is likely to rise more 
slowly than in the  decade that just ended, my calculations imply that the 
economic recovery as such will raise the rate of GDP growth by more than 
enough to outweigh the slowdown in the growth of potential GDP.  That 
extra rise in output will, however, be offset by the likely effect of the falling 
dollar and the shrinking trade deficit. In the end, the rise in available real 
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domestic resources in the decade ahead looks like it will be very similar to 
the experience of the past decade.   
 
  The increased pace of GDP growth that will be caused by the 
recovery of demand will reflect the serious deepness of the hole in which 
the U.S. economy now finds itself.  Economic growth will rise more rapidly 
than in the past as the labor market returns to full employment, as the labor 
force participation rate rises,  and as capacity utilization returns to normal.  
 
  But the decade ahead will also be a time in which the labor force will 
grow more slowly than it did in the past and in which both capital 
accumulation and multi-factor productivity are also likely to grow more 
slowly. 
 
  In these brief remarks I will try to quantify these likely developments, 
recognizing that many uncertainties remain about each of them. I will also 
consider the impact on the U.S. standard of living of the potential changes 





  The cyclical recovery will bring the unemployment rate from the 
current 10 percent of the labor force to something closer to five percent.  
The rising demand for labor will also reverse the cyclical fall in the labor 
force participation rate from the 66.1 percent before the recession began to 
the current 65.0 percent. This combined cyclical recovery of the labor force 
would be equivalent to an employment rise of 4.3 percent of the population 
or a fall in the unemployment rate equal to 6.5 percent of the current labor 
force.  
 
  Okun’s law provides a plausible if not always accurate way of 
translating this cyclical change in unemployment to a rise in GDP.  Even a 
conservative Okun’s law ratio of a 2 percent  change of GDP per point of 
unemployment implies a cyclical rise of real GDP of 13 percent over the 
next decade or an average of 1.2 percent per year. 
 
  In contrast, during the past decade the unemployment rate rose from 
4.0 percent to 10 percent and the labor force participation rate fell from 
67.1 percent to 65.0 percent.  The combined fall in employment as a share  
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of the population is equivalent to an 8.9 percent rise in the unemployment 
rate.  If that entire change in unemployment can be regarded as cyclical, 
Okun’s law implies that there was a cyclical fall of real GDP over the 
decade of 17.8 percent or 1.6 percent per year. 
 
  If the economy gets back to full employment by the end of the current 
decade and the Okun’s law relation continues to hold, real GDP will rise by 
1.2 percent a year on top of the rise in potential GDP, a sharp improvement 
from the 1.6 percent a year cyclical decline in the past decade.  
 
Changes in Potential GDP Growth 
 
  The future path of potential GDP is not likely to be as good as the 
path of potential GDP in previous decades.  The rise of potential GDP has 
three basic components:  the rise of the labor force, the increase in the 
capital stock, and the rise in multifactor productivity.   
 
The Labor Force 
 
  The rise of the labor force depends on population growth and 
changes in the labor force participation rate.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labor predicted last month that 
the coming decade will see slower population growth and a declining labor 
force participation rate.  The BLS predicts that the labor force will grow by 
only 8.2 percent between 2008 and 2018, down from the 12.1 percent rise 
in the previous ten years.  
 
  Measuring the labor force in this way ignores important aspects of 
human capital, including the age structure, education,  and occupational 
mix of the labor force.  The BLS notes, for example, that the labor force will 
be older and that a primary focus of employment growth will be in health 
care and “social assistance” occupations.  
 
  But if we focus just on the numbers in the labor force, a simple Cobb-
Douglas technology with a labor coefficient of two-thirds implies that the 
slower growth of the labor force will reduce the rise in potential GDP over 
the decade to an increase of about 0.5 percent a year, down by about 0.26 




The Capital Stock 
 
  It is more difficult to predict the changing growth of the capital stock 
and its implications for the future rise of GDP. The growth of the capital 
stock will depend on the saving behavior of households and firms, on the 
size of the future fiscal deficit,  and on the inflow of capital from abroad.  
Let’s look at each of these in turn. 
 
  Households have recently been raising their saving rates to rebuild 
the net  worth that was destroyed by the decline in the stock market and in 
home prices.  The saving rate as a percentage of disposable personal 
income rose from less than two percent in 2007 to between four and five 
percent in recent months. It is not clear whether this rising trend will 
continue in the next few years since overall household saving may be 
temporarily depressed by the unemployed individuals who reduce their 
saving in order to maintain their consumption.  But as employment rises 
later in the decade we should expect to see an increasing share of income 
going into a higher saving rate.   
 
  It is useful in this context to remember that, in the quarter century 
after 1960, the U.S. household saving rate varied between 7 percent and 
11 percent, averaging 9.2 percent of disposable personal income or about 
7 percent of GDP.   
 
  Corporate saving (i.e., undistributed corporate profits) increased 
sharply in the first three quarters of 2009, returning to the pre-recession 
level of 2006,  but is still only about 3 percent of GDP.   
 
  Combining household and corporate saving implies that private 
saving might increase during the current decade to as much as 10 percent 
of GDP.  But if the personal saving rate stays at its current level of about 
4.5 percent of disposable income or about 3 percent of GDP, total private 
saving would be only about 6 percent of GDP.   
 
  The final piece of national saving is the government surplus or, more 
accurately, the government deficit that reduces total national saving. The 
future evolution of the fiscal deficit is impossible to predict without knowing 
how the administration and Congress will respond to the current projected 
large deficits.  But it is worth noting that the IMF’s World Economic Outlook  
recently predicted that the US fiscal deficit will fall from 10 percent of GDP  
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in the current fiscal year to 6 percent in 2012 and will then remain in the 6 
to 7 percent range for the rest of the decade.  Such enormous sustained 
deficits would exceed anything that has occurred since World War II.  
 
  These projected fiscal deficits could completely absorb all of the 
private saving, leaving no national saving to finance additions to the capital 
stock.  If that happens, all net investment in plant and equipment and in 
housing would have to be financed by capital inflows from abroad. 
 
  Although the net capital inflows to the United States from the rest of 
the world (i.e., the U.S. current account deficit) have averaged 5 percent of 
U.S. GDP during the past five years, there is reason to believe that the 
volume of inflows will decrease in the years ahead. At the recent G20 
meeting, the U.S. and other nations agreed that such global imbalances 
should be reduced.  China, the largest source of the capital inflow to the 
U.S.,  is taking steps to shift from export led growth to a greater emphasis 
on domestic demand.  In addition, many countries want to shift the mix of  
currencies in their foreign exchange investments away from dollars. 
So while it is impossible to predict precisely what will happen to the 
available inflow of capital from abroad, it seems likely that the flow of 
capital to the U.S. will be smaller in the future than it has been in the past 
decade.  
 
  Changes in the national saving rate and in the capital inflow from 
abroad will change the capital stock only slowly.  The impact of this on 
GDP is therefore not likely to be large during the coming decade but could 
have a much larger cumulative effect if a decline continues beyond the 
current decade.  The changing composition of the capital stock, with a 
greater emphasis on information technology equipment and software, may 
imply rates of return that offset some of the potential decline in the total 




  In addition to the slower growth of the labor force and the uncertain 
change in the size of the capital stock, the change in potential GDP will 
depend on what happens to the rate of change of multifactor productivity.  
According to the OECD, US multifactor productivity rose at a relatively 
stable rate of about 0.75 percent a year from 1985 to 2000 (i.e.,at 0.7 
percent a year from 1985 to 1990, at the same rate from 1990 to 1995, and  
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at 0.9 percent from 1995 to 2000) and then increased to a 1.4 percent a 
year rate from 2001 through 2008. There is no way to know whether the 
increase of multifactor productivity growth will remain at its current level of 
will revert to the lower pace of the years before 2000.  
   
Combined Effect on Potential GDP 
 
  In summary, if the slower growth of the labor force reduces the 
annual GDP increase by the 0.26 percent calculated above, if there is no 
rise in productivity due to capital accumulation, and if the multifactor 
productivity declines to its pre-2000 average, the annual rate of growth of 
potential GDP will decline by about 0.9 percent to 1.4 percent a year. 
Combining these conservative assumptions about potential GDP with the 
effect of the cyclical rebound -- an estimated 1.2 percent a year cyclical rise 
in real GDP -- would produce a total real GDP increase at a rate of 2.6 
percent.  If this occurs, it would be a significant increase from the 1.9 
percent annual rate of increase of real GDP in the decade ending in 2009.  
 
The Trade Deficit and the Dollar 
 
  But the rise in real GDP is only part of the story of what will happen to 
real domestically available income over the coming decade. Even if the 
amount of GDP produced in the United States rises at a rate of 2.6 percent, 
not all of that extra output will remain in the United States.  If we shrink our 
trade deficit over the decade by three percent of GDP, the rise in exports 
and decline in imports will reduce the rise of output available for U.S. 
consumption and investment by about 0.3 percent a year. 
 
  The effect of a decline of the dollar could be equally important.  The 
real trade-weighted value of the dollar fell some 25 percent between 2002 
and 2008, before it rose temporarily as nervous investors world-wide 
rushed to buy short term US Treasuries. It is of course impossible to predict 
the path of the dollar over the coming decade.  But consider the effect if the 
dollar does fall another 25 percent as part of the process of shrinking the 
U.S. trade deficit and that the full effect of that dollar decline is reflected in 
the price of imports, no doubt a simplification. 
 
  Since the U.S. imports of goods and services are usually about 17 
percent of US GDP (although recently reduced by the recession),  a 25 
percent fall of the dollar would raise the cost of imports by about 4 percent  
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of GDP.  So when Americans trade U.S. production for foreign goods, the 
17 percent of GDP that we spend on imports will buy about 4 percent less 
in real terms.  This in effect reduces the growth of our real incomes by 
about 0.4 percent a year. 
 
  The combined effect of a reduced trade deficit (0.3 percent fewer 
goods and services available in the U.S. each year)  and of the higher price 
of imports (equivalent to a 0.4 percent of GDP decline in the real volume of 
goods and services that Americans can obtain by their spending on imports 
) would reduce the growth of real domestically available GDP by 0.7 
percent a year over the coming decade, a significant reduction of the 2.6 
percent projected growth of real GDP output.  The net annual rate of 
increase in the total real goods and services available for US consumption 
and investment -- both domestically produced and imported -- would 
therefore be only 1.9 percent a  year.   
 
Comparison with the Previous Decade 
 
  Real GDP, as conventionally measured in the national income and 
product accounts, rose by 21 percent between 1999 and 2009, an annual 
rate of increase of 1.9 percent. 
   
  During that same decade the U.S. trade deficit went from 2.8 percent 
of GDP in 1999 to 4.8 percent in 2008 (before the recession depressed 
imports), expanding the physical volume of goods and services available in 
the United States by 2 percentage points.  But the decade also 
experienced a 13 percent fall in the real trade weighted value of the dollar, 
increasing the cost of imports by about 2 percent of GDP.  These two 
effects cancelled each other out, leaving the the estimated real usable rise 
in domestically available GDP  at 1.9 percent a year.  
 
  Surprisingly, this is the same rate of growth of domestically available 
GDP that my calculations imply for the decade ahead. 
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